We hypothesize that institutional monitoring will be greatest when the target firm represents a significant allocation of funds in the institution's portfolio. We show that this measure is important in reconciling mixed findings for total institutional ownership in the prior literature. The results indicate that our measure of institutional holdings leads to greater bid completion rates, higher premiums and lower acquirer returns. This empirical evidence provides support for theories predicting a beneficial effect of blockholders in monitoring the firm in general and in enhancing the gains to takeover targets in particular.
Introduction
The importance of large shareholders has been long recognized in the finance literature. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) propose large shareholders as a solution to the free-rider problem of Grossman and Hart (1980) . Similarly, the monitoring role of institutional shareholders has received considerable academic attention (see, for example, Hartzell and Starks, 2003 and Chen, Harford and Li, 2007 ). Yet, despite Shleifer and Vishny's explicit prediction that large shareholders can facilitate acquisitions even if they do not initiate them, unambiguous empirical evidence of such a role is absent from the literature, even when focusing on institutional blockholdings. Most studies now treat institutional ownership in a realized or potential target as a control variable which is routinely associated with target premiums that are either positive (Edmans, Goldstein and Jiang, 2012 and Gaspar, Massa and Matos, 2005) , insignificant (Bargeron, Schlingemann, Stulz and Zutter, 2008 and Ayers, Lefanowicz and Robinson, 2003) , or negative (Huang, 2011, and Stulz, Walkling and Song, 1990 ).
However, when institutions have multiple holdings across firms, they accrue differing benefits to monitoring effort across firms as well. While an institution may hold a block in a given firm, that firm may represent a small part of the institution's total portfolio. A shareholder, institutional or otherwise, will focus its efforts on its largest holdings. When institutions have differing portfolio weights on an individual firm, total institutional ownership is a noisy measure of the underlying variable of interest: how much of the firm is held by institutions for which this is a significant holding?
In this paper, we assume that institutions allocate their monitoring effort to a firm based on the relative importance of the firm's stock in their portfolio. We define monitoring institutions as those whose holding value in the firm is in the top 10% of their portfolio. Using three measures based on the size of holdings by monitoring institutions in a given firm, we examine the role of institutional investors in the acquisition process. The acquisition process is an ideal laboratory to study the impact of such institutions because of their theoretically predicted role and the substantial external effects that their monitoring can generate in that setting.
Our results indicate that traditional institutional ownership proxies (measured relative to the target firm's outstanding shares) such as the number of (or the ownership by) blockholders are not related to the probability of deal completion, to the likelihood of bid revision, or to the premium offered for the target firm.
In contrast, we find that the probability of deal completion is increasing in the holdings of monitoring institutions in the target firm. A one standard deviation increase in the ownership of monitoring institutions results in a 6% higher probability of completion. Nonetheless, the presence of these interested monitoring institutions results in higher final premiums and lower acquirer returns as well. Specifically, a standard deviation increase in their holdings leads to a 4% higher probability of a bid revision and a 2.7% higher final premium (which translates into an additional $40 million for the average deal value of $1.49 billion). The end result is an acquirer announcement return that is lower by 0.6%.
Thus as the theory predicts, these investors facilitate completion of the deal, but at terms that are more favorable than average for the target. In a way, their presence as a monitoring institution with some negotiating power produces effects similar to those found in Hartzell, Ofek and Yermack (2004) . The difference is that, unlike target CEOs, they cannot be bought-off with private benefits, so the benefits they negotiate for completion certainty accrue to all target shareholders.
Given that the terms are less favorable for the bidder, we test whether the presence of more monitoring institutions decreases the frequency of receiving a bid and find that it does.
Relative to the 4% unconditional probability of receiving a bid, a standard deviation increase in monitoring institution ownership decreases the probability by 0.6%. Nonetheless, the net effect of lower bid frequency against higher premium and completion rate conditional on a bid is approximately zero in terms of the overall wealth impact on firm shareholders (as shown by unconditional premium regressions following Comment and Schwert (1995) ). This evidence is consistent with the expected effect of monitoring institutions being incorporated into the price of the firms they monitor.
We show that these results hold accounting for the endogeneity of the shares owned by monitoring institutions, as well as controlling for the traditional measures of institutional ownership. We conclude that, as theory predicts, institutional investors are important to the outcome of an acquisition bid. However, due to limited resources and attention, these effects are only present when the stockholdings themselves are an important part of the institution's portfolio. Thus our contribution comes both from suggesting a better measure of the relevant stakes for activist monitoring in a firm and from demonstrating the net impact of such monitors on the acquisition process.
Our paper is related to work by Brickley, Lease and Smith (1988) , Bushee (1998) , Chen, Harford and Li (2007) , and Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach (2009) . All of those authors focus on heterogeneity in institutional investors to identify which institutions are more likely to play an active monitoring role. Our work also contributes to the vast literature on mergers and acquisitions, particularly papers that study the role of institutional investors in the process (e.g. Huang, 2011) and those that examine the relative bargaining power of the parties (e.g. Ahern, 2012).
Our study proceeds as follows. We develop our hypothesis in section 2. In section 3 we describe our sample and the variables we use to examine institutional ownership. Section 4 presents our empirical analyses and section 5 discusses additional tests we carry out in order to assess the robustness of our results. Section 6 contains our conclusions. The Appendix provides the definition of all the variables we use in this study.
Hypothesis development
Monitoring costs include the costs of gathering information, analyzing it, and acting on it, including the costs of influencing others (be they the firm managers or other shareholders).
Institutions can find it beneficial to become specialized monitors. That is, the internalizable monitoring benefit to their larger and potentially longer-term investments can outweigh the costs of gathering information and acting on it. However, unless they hold their portfolio firms in equal proportion, they will not exert equal monitoring effort across their holdings. Just as the fact that they hold more shares than the atomistic investor makes it beneficial for them to monitor at all, the fact that they invest more of their funds in some firms makes it relatively more beneficial for them to monitor those firms. So, their monitoring activities will be higher for firms in which they have invested a larger fraction of their portfolio.
Thus, we have our primary hypothesis, which is that monitoring activities in a given firm will be increasing in the importance of that firm to the institutions that hold it.
For a given firm, we will use the term monitoring institutions to refer to those institutions investing a significant fraction of their portfolio in that firm. We test our primary hypothesis in the context of acquisitions. We predict that monitoring institutions will facilitate completion of an acquisition bid. They can do this either by voting or tendering their shares for the merger or by pressuring target managers to accept the bid.
The effect of monitoring institutions on the premium is ambiguous. They may facilitate more deals, including some lower premium deals that may have been otherwise successfully resisted by entrenched target managers. Conversely, their size and active interest may mitigate the coordination problem among target shareholders, allowing institutions to bargain for a higher premium. Nonetheless, in a model that controls for the other determinants of the premium, the incremental effect of the monitoring institutions should be to increase the final premium. Thus, we predict that, ceteris paribus, monitoring institutions increase the premium.
The bargaining of the monitoring institutions is predicted to increase the premium to target shareholders, but should not increase the net synergies to the deal, which are determined by the operational fit of the acquirer and target. If monitoring institutions successfully bargain for more of the gains from the merger for target shareholders, then the net effect on acquirer shareholders will be negative. Thus, we predict that the incremental effect of the presence of monitoring institutions on acquirer announcement returns is negative.
Taken alone, the prediction that monitoring institutions will facilitate bid completion would also imply that there should be more bids for firms with monitoring institutions. However, the prediction that these institutions will also influence the bargaining over the value of the synergies has the opposite implication for attracting bids in the first place. Thus, the presence of monitoring institutions has an ambiguous effect on the probability of being targeted. To explore these issues in greater detail, we conduct a number of multivariate analyses with data which is described in the next section.
Sample formation and institutional ownership variables
This section details the sample of mergers and acquisition (M&A) bids we analyze as well as the proxies we use to track the ownership by institutional investors in the target firms we study.
Sample overview
We start with 7,292 M&A offers tracked by the Securities Data Company (SDC) announced during 1984-2011 in which both the target and the acquirer are publicly traded U.S.
companies with a transaction value of at least $1 million. Our sample begins in 1984 because Chen, Harford and Li (2007) note that the M&A information in SDC is incomplete before 1984.
Following Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2004) and Masulis, Wang and Xie (2007) , this initial sample excludes spinoffs, recapitalizations, exchange offers, repurchases, self-tenders, privatizations, acquisitions of remaining interest, partial interests or assets, and transactions whose value relative to the bidder's market capitalization at the fiscal year end prior to the merger announcement is less than 1%. We keep 3,377 deals in which targets and acquirers have stock market and accounting data available from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and from Compustat, respectively. We exclude transactions without coverage for the target company from the Thomson-Reuters Institutional Holdings 13F database (formerly known as CDA/Spectrum). This database contains ownership information by institutional managers with $100 million or more in assets under management. These criteria yield our final sample of 1,601 deals.
Panel A of Table 1 provides the temporal and industrial distribution of our sample. We note that the annual number of bids declines at the beginning of our sample and also during 2008-2009 which coincide with periods of economic contraction. Conversely, the number of transactions is higher during the 1998 to 2001 period of economic expansion when the stock market valuation is higher. The temporal distribution of our sample is in line with the merger activity reported in numerous prior studies. The industrial distribution of our sample targets is based on the Fama and French (1997) classification. Targets are well scattered across several industries with two exceptions. The Business Services (which includes software) and the Banking sectors exhibit some clustering with just over 12% and 21% of the target firms belonging to those industries, respectively. Moreover, targets in the Banking, Insurance, Real Estate and Trading (which, broadly defined, correspond to the Financial industry) account for over 27% of the observations. While most studies typically exclude the Financial industry, there were two merger waves in that industry during our sample period, accounting for its high representation. Nonetheless, because of the high concentration of targets in the Financial sector, in robustness tests we verify that our results are not driven by firms that belong to this industry. (2003) report a mean value of 1.63 for the targets they study. The mean leverage for our target firms is slightly above 21% which is comparable to that of 20% in Cai and Sevilir (2012).
Measures of institutional ownership
Panel A in Table 2 reports summary statistics for different measures of institutional ownership. The first five rows in the table provide institutional ownership measured relative to the target firms' shares outstanding which are the metrics most often used in the literature. Targets in our sample have an average of 1.5 blockholders and these blockholders account for about 5.5% of all institutions holding the target's shares. Blockholders are defined as institutions owning at least 5% of the target's shares. The mean (median) target equity ownership by blockholders in our sample is 12.66% (9.16%). On average, the largest shareholding by an institution is just over 8%. For a similar measure, Chen, Harford and Li (2007) report an average of 7.1%. We find that the top five institutions (in terms of ownership) control approximately 21% of the target's shares. Comparably, Hartzell and Starks (2003) report that the top five institutions in their sample control about 22% of the firm's stock.
The last three rows in Panel A present our proposed measures of institutional ownership.
These measures capture the relative importance of the target firm to the institutional investor. As argued earlier, we hypothesize that monitoring activities in a given target firm will be increasing in the importance of that firm to the institutions that hold it. Based on this conjecture, we define monitoring institutions as those whose holding value in the target firm is in the top 10% of their portfolio.
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On average, targets in our sample are held by 4 institutions classified as monitoring institutions and they account for only 2.4% of all institutions holding the target shares. The mean total target equity ownership by monitoring institutions is 6.83%.
Panel A shows important differences between the traditional blockholder metrics and our monitoring institutions measures. For instance, the distribution of the number of monitoring institutions is remarkably different from that for the number of blockholders. The latter variable exhibits a lower mean, a higher median, and a much lower standard deviation. Likewise, total ownership by institutional investors exceeds the total ownership by monitoring institutions in terms of both the mean and the median. These distributional differences are also evident when we look at the annual decomposition of the traditional blockholder and our proposed monitoring institutions variables in Panel B of Table 2. 2 All of our results continue to hold when we change the holding value threshold in the target to be in the top 5% of the institution's portfolio.
Institutional monitoring during acquisitions
In order to study the effect of (and possible oversight exerted by) monitoring institutions we perform a number of multivariate tests. The definitions for all of the variables used in these analyses are provided in the Appendix.
Deal completion
We first examine the relation between institutional ownership and deal completion. In Table 3 , we report the estimation of four variants of a logit model in which the dependent variable equals one for completed deals and zero for withdrawn deals. Officer (2003) and Bates and Lemmon (2003) estimate similar models. Therefore, except for the controls for institutional ownership, all independent variables in our regressions are similar to theirs. To account for the role of institutional investors, all the tests in Table 3 control for total institutional blockholder ownership in the target firm. In addition, in models (2), (3), and (4) we respectively add the number of monitoring institutions, the proportion of monitoring institutions, and the total ownership of monitoring institutions as control variables.
We note that the blockholder variable -an often-used proxy to control for institutional ownership in the literature -does not attain statistical significance in any of the tests reported in Table 3 . In contrast, all of our proxies for monitoring institutions exhibit positive and statistically significant coefficients which translate in a non-trivial effect on the likelihood that the deal materializes. For example, according to the marginal effect in model (4), a one standard deviation increase in ownership by monitoring institutions is associated with a 6.01 percentage point increase in the probability of deal completion.
Results for the other independent variables in Table 3 Tender offers are 8.34 percentage points more likely to go through, as are mergers in which the parties to the transaction are in the same industry. Comment and Schwert (1995) and Schwert (2000) argue that deal attitude is crucial for mergers to be completed. This is certainly true in our sample: Deals characterized as hostile are 38.6 percentage points less likely to be completed.
Bid revisions
An analysis of the bid revisions for the transactions in our sample provides a test of the potential monitoring by institutional investors and the effect of such oversight on the wealth of shareholders. We define a bid revision as the percent difference between the initial and final bid premium offered for the target firm as recorded by SDC. 3 We note that 161 (or 10.05%) of the bids in our sample suffer a revision. This incidence is similar to that of 10.32% in Bates, Lemmon and Linck (2006) .
In Table 4 , we estimate five bid revision logit regressions similar to those in Bates, Lemmon and Linck (2006) . The dependent variable is set to one in model (1) if there is any bid revision, in model (2) if the bid is revised downward, and in models (3)-(5) if the bid is revised upward. The variables used to control for institutional ownership are similar to those we use in the deal completion tests.
Our bid revision regressions indicate that the total ownership by blockholders is not related to any of our bid revision dependent variables. Conversely, all of our proxies for institutional monitoring are associated with increases in the bid premium offered to the target firms. According to the marginal effect we estimate in model (3), a one standard deviation increase in ownership by monitoring institutions increases the probability of an upward bid premium revision by 5.2 percentage points. We note that the same monitoring institution variable is unrelated to the probability that the initial bid is revised downward. 4 The results in Table 4 appear consistent with our hypothesis that institutions are more likely to monitor a firm when it becomes a takeover target -particularly when the firm is an important holding in the institution's portfolio.
Acquisition premiums
If a takeover target represents a key holding in an institution's portfolio which leads this investor to intensify its monitoring, then we may observe such effect in the premium offered to the target. Therefore, we examine the role of both the traditional and our proposed measure of institutional ownership on the acquisition premiums. Before performing this analysis, we note that companies do not randomly become takeover targets. This phenomenon is important because it introduces the potential of self-selection. To address this issue, we employ the twostep procedure suggested in Heckman (1979) . In Panel A of Table 5 , we estimate four logit regressions of the probability of becoming an acquisition target using 154,227 firm-year observations during 1983-2011. In all tests, the dependent variable is set to one if the firm becomes a takeover target and is set to zero otherwise. Our specification augments those in Palepu (1986) due to the inclusion of our controls for institutional ownership.
The results in Panel A indicate that total institutional blockholder ownership has no significant effect on the probability of becoming a target. In contrast, all of our monitoring institutions' proxies attain negative and significant coefficients. The marginal effect we estimate in model (4) of Panel A indicates that a single standard deviation increase in ownership by monitoring institutions lowers the likelihood of becoming a target by 0.6%. To put this result in perspective, the unconditional probability of becoming a target in the sample analyzed in Panel A of Table 5 is 4.41%.
Following the procedure in Heckman, we estimate an inverse Mill's ratio from each of the four models in Panel A in Table 5 and respectively use them as additional controls in the four premium regressions we report in Panel B of Table 5 . These regressions include year-and industry-fixed effects and use the four-week premium reported by SDC as the dependent variable.
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Our target premium tests closely follow the specification in Bargeron, Schlingemann, Stulz, and Zutter (2010) . In model (1), the main independent variable is the total ownership held by blockholders in the target firm. In model (2), (3), and (4) the independent variables of interest are the number of monitoring institutions, the proportion of monitoring institutions, and the total ownership of monitoring institutions, respectively.
We note that the estimates for several control variables in Table 5 are in agreement with the existing M&A literature. For example, we find acquisition premiums to be higher in deals characterized as tender offers (Bates, Lemmon and Linck, 2006) . Premiums also increase when the transaction includes a target termination fee (Bates and Lemmon, 2003, and Officer, 2003) , when there are competing bids (Gaspar, Massa and Matos, 2005) , and when cash is used as the sole medium to pay for the consideration (Aktas, de Bodt and Roll, 2010) . In contrast, acquisition premiums are inversely related to the size of the target firm (Bargeron, Schlingemann, Stulz, and Zutter, 2008) , to the relative size of the parties (Cai and Sevilir, 2012) , and also decline when the transaction is characterized as a merger of equals (Wulf, 2004, and Wang and Xie, 2009 ).
More importantly, the coefficient for the blockholder variable is not statistically significant in any of the premium regressions reported in Panel B of Table 5 . However, the same tests document an economically important positive association between all of our monitoring institutions proxies and the takeover premiums. According to the estimates in model (4), increasing the ownership of monitoring institutions by one standard deviation translates into a premium increase of 2.72 percentage points. For the average transaction in our sample, this increase represents an additional $40.4 million in terms of deal value for the target shareholders.
These results support our view that institutions do monitor targets, particularly when targets account for an important holding in the institutions' portfolios.
Unconditional premiums
In their study of poison pills, Comment and Schwert (1995, p.30) argue that "The estimated effect of antitakeover measures on the unconditional premium is of interest because it is a net effect of a decrease in the premium if antitakeover devices deter offers and an increase if they increase premiums in successful takeovers." Unlike poison pills, institutional ownership is not an antitakeover device. Nevertheless, the tests in Panel A of Table 5 suggest that monitoring institutions deter takeover offers as we find an inverse association between these institutions and the probability that a firm becomes a takeover target. At the same time, in Panel B of Table 5 we find that monitoring institutions are associated with higher takeover premiums. To examine the net effect of these institutions in the gains to target shareholders we use the method in Comment and Schwert (1995) to estimate unconditional premium regressions. We run these tests, which are reported in Table 6 , in a sample of 154,227 firm-years with data available from CRSP and Compustat during 1983-2011. As in Comment and Schwert, we set the premium to zero in nontakeover firm-years. Our unconditional premium regressions control for institutional ownership in a manner similar to that in previous multivariate tests.
The estimates in Table 6 show that neither the blockholder variable nor our monitoring institutions proxies is a statistically significant function of the unconditional premium. Therefore, together with our earlier results, the tests in Table 6 suggest that the net effect of lower bid frequency against higher premium and completion rate conditional on a bid is approximately zero in terms of the overall wealth impact on target shareholders. This evidence suggests that monitoring institutions are relevant-their effect is already incorporated into the price of the firms they monitor.
Endogeneity
Recent work by Giannetti and Simonov (2006) shows that institutions appear reluctant to invest in companies with weak corporate governance. Their findings suggest that even if institutions are able and motivated (due to higher stockholdings) to monitor a firm, they prefer to invest in companies in which monitoring may not be necessary. Under a similar logic and in our setting, it is possible that institutions raise their shareholdings in firms that are poised to earn higher premiums if they become acquisition targets. Under this possibility, causality runs in the opposite direction and our assertion that the higher deal completion probabilities and takeover premiums we observe obtain due to the influence of monitoring institutions would be incorrect.
To address the endogeneity problem just described, we employ a fuzzy regression discontinuity design approach in the context of an instrumental variable (IV) estimation similar to that Schmidt (2012) and Crane, Michenaud and Weston (2012). 6 Following their empirical scheme, our identification strategy exploits the nature of the Russell index composition and annual reconstitution. Every year in June, the largest 1,000 firms (in terms of market capitalization) are selected to make up the Russell 1000 index and the next 2,000 firms are included in the Russell 2000 index. Since both indices are value-weighted, institutions tracking them will have to adjust their holdings in particular firms when these companies switch from one index to the other, enter one of the indices for the first time, or leave an index. These adjustments are likely to create a non-trivial exogenous discontinuity in a firm's ownership structure. Indeed, Chang and Hong (2012) find that firms that are first included in the Russell 2000 index experience higher returns after the index is reconstituted. Those authors argue that this phenomenon is due to price pressure that results from higher institutional demand for the new Russell 2000 stocks.
To evaluate the causal relationship between monitoring institutions and bid premiums we use an IV approach based on the changes in holdings by these institutions upon index reconstitutions. These changes in holdings are likely to change the number, proportion, and total ownership of the monitoring institutions in our sample.
To implement the IV estimator, we first regress changes in the number of monitoring institutions on a set of instruments and control variables. As in Schmidt (2012), the instruments consist of discrete changes (dummy variables to indicate index switches, index departures, and index entrances) and continuous changes tracked by differences in the annual Russell Rankings.
For the first stage test, we use 154,227 firm-year observations with data available from both CRSP and Compustat during 1983-2011. We calculate changes in the number of monitoring institutions from the end of the third quarter in year t-1 to the end of the third quarter in year t because index reconstitutions occur annually at the end of May/beginning of June. The first stage regression of the change in the number monitoring institutions is reported as model (1) in Table   7 .
In the second-stage test, the fitted values for the change in the number of monitoring institutions become the key explanatory variable in the premium regression reported in model (2) of Table 7 . The coefficient for the instrumented variable of the change in the number of monitoring institutions is positive and statistically significant. This finding indicates that target firms that became a top holding in an institution's portfolio (due to Russell index reconstitutions) receive higher takeover premiums. This result suggests that these monitoring investors are responsible for the higher premium and, therefore, mitigates the concern that causality runs in the opposite direction.
We employ a similar empirical procedure to instrument for the proportion of monitoring institutions as well as for the total ownership of monitoring institutions. The second stage results for these proxies, which are respectively reported as models (4) and (6) in Table 7 , also suggest that monitoring institutions cause target firms to earn higher premiums. Overall, the results in Table 7 support the hypothesis that institutional monitoring will be greatest when the target firm represents a significant allocation of funds in the institution's portfolio.
Acquirer returns
To test whether monitoring institutions of the target firm affect the returns to acquirers, in Table 8 , we run four ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of the three-day merger announcement cumulative abnormal return (CAR) meeting the bidders in our sample. This CAR is centered on the acquisition announcement day. We follow the M&A literature in order to properly specify our acquirer return regressions. Therefore, all models in Table 8 control for variables similar to those in the acquirer return tests performed by Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004) and by Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007) . In our acquirer return tests, we expand the specification in those studies by including our proxies for institutional ownership.
The estimates in Table 8 indicate that acquirer returns decrease in our target monitoring institutions proxies. Using the estimate in model (4), a one standard deviation increase in the ownership of monitoring institutions is associated with a 0.62% decrease in the return to the acquirer. This drop implies a value decline of $4.37 million for the average bidder in our sample with a market capitalization of $704 million. Together with the results from our bid premium regressions, our acquirer return tests indicate that monitoring institutions either increase the bargaining power or effort of the target managers, resulting in them negotiating a bigger "piece of the pie" for their shareholders.
Our results show that M&A deals in which there is oversight by monitoring institutions of the target firm exhibit a transfer of some of the synergy gain from acquirer shareholders to target shareholders. The fact that the ownership structure of the target firm affects the gains to the acquirer is potentially important because it raises the possibility that cross-ownership by institutions can account for this result. We address this issue in one of the additional tests provided in the next section.
Additional analyses
In this section, we perform a number of tests in order to probe the reliability of the reported findings, assess the robustness of our results, and consider alternative explanations.
Acquisition premium and acquirer return alternatives
The regressions presented in Table 5 Panel B use the four-week premium reported by SDC as the dependent variable. In untabulated analyses, we re-estimate these regressions using three different premium measures as dependent variables. The first is the target's CAR during the window (-20, +1) relative to the announcement date as in Jarrell and Poulsen (1989) . Our second measure follows Schwert (1996) and uses the target's CAR during the window (-42, +126). Our third measure uses the "combined" merger premium defined in Officer (2003) as the dependent variable. The results of the regressions that use the three alternative measures also document a positive and economically important association between monitoring institutions and the takeover premium. For instance, raising the total ownership of monitoring institutions by one standard deviation is associated with an increase of 3.32% in the combined premium.
We estimate several regressions similar to those reported in Table 8 . In these tests we follow the procedure in Masulis Wang, and Xie (2007) and replace the acquirer's return (-1, +1) with the CAR accruing to the bidder on deal announcement during the (-2, +2) and (-5, +5) windows. Looking at Panel A of Table 9 , we note that the coefficients for the total ownership of monitoring institutions in the target firm are still negatively related to the acquirer's return as measured during these alternative windows. In contrast, estimates for the target blockholder variable do not attain statistical significance at conventional levels. 7 Specifically, following Officer (2003), we first estimate a premium based on component data using the aggregate value of cash, stock, and other securities offered by the bidder to target shareholders as reported by SDC. We then estimate premiums based on initial price and final price data, respectively. These prices are also reported by SDC. All premium measures are then deflated by the target's market value 42 trading days prior to the bid announcement. The combined premium is based on the component measure if it is greater than zero and less than two. Otherwise, the premium relies on the initial price measure (or on the final price measure if initial price data are missing).
Excluding targets in the financial industry
As noted earlier, just over one fifth of the targets in our sample operate in the Financial sector (see Panel A of Table 1 ). Although all of our multivariate tests include industry fixedeffects, we check whether our results hold if we remove these targets from our regressions. The tests in Panels B and C of Table 9 exclude targets operating in the Financial industry from the analysis. In Panel B of Table 9 we report the coefficients for our monitoring institutions variables from premium regressions similar to those reported in Panel B of Table 5 . As with the earlier results, all variables exhibit positive and significant coefficients. Panel C of Table 9 reports estimates for our monitoring institution proxies from acquirer return tests that follow the specification reported in Table 8 . The results in Panel C of Table 9 continue to document an inverse association between our monitoring institutions proxies and the return to the bidder firms. In general, the results in Panels B and C of Table 9 alleviate concerns that our findings are driven by observations in the Financial industry.
Corporate governance
To address concerns that monitoring institutions simply invest in targets that are better governed and, therefore, more likely to earn higher premiums, we conduct a two-part analysis similar to that in Chen, Harford and Li (2007) . The first step includes estimating three Next, we retain the residuals from the three monitoring institutions tests we estimate in the first step described above. These residuals (which measure the abnormal level of our monitoring institutions proxies) are used as the key independent variables in premium regressions which are specified similar to those in Table 4 . We report the estimates for the abnormal level of monitoring institutions variables in Panel D of Table 9 . These coefficients capture the oversight role by monitoring institutions that is purged from the effect of either the governance or the performance of the target firm. We find that the abnormal monitoring institutions estimates are positive and significantly associated with the bid premium. These findings (in tandem with those from the endogeneity tests in Table 7 ) assuage the concern that our results are the byproduct of institutional monitors investing according to the better governance or the superior performance of the target firms.
Cross-holdings
Our results show that institutions for which the target constitutes a top ten holding are associated with higher premiums paid for the targets and with lower acquirer returns. Matvos and Ostrovsky (2008) argue that gains on target shares held by the bidder's institutional investors more than offset their losses on bidder shares. To consider this possibility, for each target in our sample, we perform a shareholder-by-shareholder analysis. This test shows that monitoring institutions do not generally hold shares of the bidder firm, and in the few cases in which they do, they tend to have very small stakes. These results are consistent with the findings on crossholdings of Harford, Jenter and Li (2011) , who show that it is uncommon for crossholding institutions to have large stakes in both the bidder and target. Given this, it is unlikely that crossholdings explain our results. Nonetheless, we rerun our target premium and acquirer return tests controlling for the presence of cross-holdings. We find that such control does not alter our results.
Alternative blockholder measures
In all of our multivariate tests we use total ownership by blockholders in the target firm to control for the holdings by institutions measured relative to the target firm's outstanding shares.
This variable fails to achieve statistical significance in our analyses. We repeat all of our multivariate tests replacing the blockholder ownership with (i) the number of blockholders, (ii) the proportion of blockholders, (iii) the ownership by the largest five institutions, and (iv) the ownership of the largest institution. None of these alternative measures of institutional ownership in the target firm attain significant coefficients. In contrast, our monitoring institution proxies continue to obtain statistically significant estimates in all tests.
We note that proxy (iii) above is similar to one of the two measures put forth by Hartzell and Starks (2003) . They find that this measure as well as the Herfindahl index of institutional fractional holdings (which they refer to as institutional concentration) is related to the pay-forperformance of managerial compensation. We use their Herfindahl index measure as the key independent variable in a premium regression (similar to those in Table 5 Panel B). The coefficient estimate for this variable is 0.0325 with an associated p-value of 0.5572.
Summary and conclusions
Several studies theorize that through activism, intervention and monitoring, large shareholders (such as institutional investors) can enhance the value of the firm (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Maug, 1998; Kahn and Winton, 1998) . Nonetheless, empirical evidence on the purported role of institutions in improving shareholder wealth is mixed. In a survey of the literature, Holderness (2003) asserts that with the exception of the form (and level) of executive compensation, few major corporate decisions have been shown to be different in the presence of blockholders. He notes that academic studies have not definitely established whether the impact of blockholders on firm value is positive or negative. We argue that the lack of academic consensus in assessing the impact of institutional ownership on shareholder wealth stems from the way the ownership is typically measured. Specifically, most studies track institutional ownership relative to a public firm's outstanding common equity. The logic behind this measure is that the more equity the institution holds, the more likely it is that the firm will pay attention to this investor. This logic, however, ignores the possibility that even if the firm has to pay attention to an institution -because the latter holds an important block of the firm's shares -the institution may not be interested in monitoring it. This could happen because, relative to the institution's own portfolio, the firm may not be an important holding.
To investigate this issue, in this paper we propose a new way to proxy for the effect of institutional investors: we measure institutional ownership relative to the institution's entire portfolio. We hypothesize that the more funds an institution invests in a given firm, the more likely the institution is to monitor that firm. Based on this premise, we define monitoring institutions as those for which the firm constitutes a top ten portfolio holding.
We test our hypotheses in the context of acquisitions. This choice is motivated by the fact that acquisitions are notable investments in which the incentives of managers and investors are not always aligned.
Our results show that in M&A transactions monitoring institutions of the target firm are associated with (i) a higher probability of deal completion, (ii) a higher bid premium offered for the target firm, (iii) an increased likelihood that the bid for the target firm is revised upward, and (iv) a lower acquirer return. These findings support the view that institutional monitoring heightens when the target firm represents a top allocation of funds in the institution's portfolio.
By proposing a better measure of the relevant shareholdings for activist investors in a firm and by showing the net impact of such monitors on M&A deals, our study has broad implications for the literature studying the effect of institutional ownership on firm value. Our findings show that our monitoring institutions proxies better capture the influence and potential activism by institutional investors. We show that a firm is likely to listen to a monitoring institution even if this investor is not a blockholder. This could happen because, otherwise, the institution will try to coordinate with other investors (in order to have its voice heard) or will sell its stake. Both of these alternatives may attract unfavorable attention to the firm and its managers. Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007) . In addition, we require that both acquirer and target firms have stock market, accounting, and institutional ownership data available from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), Compustat, and Thomson 13F, respectively. In Panel A we report the temporal and Fama and French 48 industrial distribution of the sample targets. In Panel B we report deal and target financial characteristics. All financial variables are measured at the end of the fiscal year before the merger public announcement date and inflation-adjusted to the end of 2011. In this table we report summary statistics of the target firm's institutional monitoring proxies: (1) commonly used in the literature and (2) proposed in this paper.
Panel A: Temporal and industrial distribution
We report the 5 variables traditionally used to proxy for institutional monitoring. The sample consists of 1,601 mergers and acquisitions announced during 1984-2011 described in Table 1 . We run logit regressions of bid revision probability similar to those in Bates, Lemmon, and Linck (2006) . The dependent variable equals one if there is a revision of the bid price in Model (1), downward price revision in Model (2), and upward revision in Models (3)-(5). The main independent variable is the total ownership of monitoring institutions in Models (1)- (3), the number of monitoring institutions in Model (4), and the proportion of monitoring institutions among all target's institutions in Model (5). All variables are defined in the appendix. We report p-values in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Panel A presents first stage regressions of the probability of becoming a takeover target using 154,227 firmyears with data from CRSP and Compustat during fiscal year 1983-2011. These tests are similar to those in Palepu (1986) . In Panel B we estimate OLS regressions of merger premiums similar to those in Bargeron, Schlingemann, Stulz, and Zutter (2008) . The dependent variable is the final offer premium reported by SDC. The main independent variable is the number of monitoring institutions in Model (2), the proportion of monitoring institutions among all target's institutions in Model (3), and the total ownership of monitoring institutions in Model (4). The sample consists of 1,601 mergers and acquisitions described in Table 1 . We include the inverse Mill's ratio obtained from the first stage test to control for target self-selection (Heckman, 1979) . All variables are defined in the appendix. We report p-values in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. This table addresses the endogeneity of institutional monitoring and the acquisition premiums using a regression discontinuity approach around index inclusions. The specification is similar to that in Schmidt (2013). Model (1) presents the first stage regression of the change in the number of monitoring institutions on target characteristics and Russell index inclusions using 154,227 firm-years with data from CRSP and Compustat during fiscal year 1983-2011. Model (2) presents the second stage regression of the acquisition premium on the predicted change in the number of monitoring institutions obtained from the first stage. Model (3) presents the regular regression of the acquisition premium on the change in the number of monitoring institutions. We use the proportion of monitoring institutions among all target's institutions in Models (4) and (5), and the total ownership of monitoring institutions in Models (6) and (7). In Models (2) to (7), the sample consists of 1,601 mergers and acquisitions described in Table 1 . All variables are defined in the appendix. We report p-values in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. (2003), we first estimate a premium based on "component" data using the aggregate value of cash, stock, and other securities offered by the bidder to target shareholders as reported by SDC. We then estimate premiums based on "initial price" and "final price" data, respectively. These prices are also reported by SDC. All premium measures are then deflated by the target's market value 42 trading days prior to the bid announcement. The combined premium is based on the component measure if it is greater than 0% and less than 200%; otherwise the premium relies on the initial price measure (or on the final price measure if initial price data are missing). Target CAR the target's cumulative abnormal return over the window around the merger announcement date, calculated as the residual from the market model estimated during the one year window ending four weeks prior to the merger announcement Acquirer CAR the acquirer's cumulative abnormal return over the window around the merger announcement date, calculated as the residual from the market model estimated during the one year window ending four weeks prior to the merger announcement Completion (0,1) one if the announced deal is completed Target termination fee (0,1) one if the deal has a termination fee provision for the target Lockup one if the target firm moves to the Russell 2000 from below the top 3000  Ranking in Russell ( t-1 , t ) change in the target firm's ranking in the Russell from time t-1 to t
Number of monitoring institutions Proportion of monitoring inst Ownership of monitoring inst

Other variables
Heckman self-selectivity the Heckman (1981) lambda obtained from a two stage estimation process. In the first-stage, we estimate the probability of becoming a target. In the second stage, the inverse Mill's ratio from the first stage model is included in the estimation as a variable to control for self-selection.
